The recent revelation, first reported by the Financial Times on a Tuesday, that FIFA intends to off‑load a portion of its commercial arm has ignited a wave of shock and indignation throughout the global football community. The governing body for the sport is planning to sell a 21 per cent interest in a newly created subsidiary called FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE). This vehicle will house all of FIFA's commercial activities and event‑related operations, including the World Cup – the tournament that, as highlighted by The Athletic, remains the primary source of revenue for the organisation. The goal of the transaction is to raise roughly $4.2 billion (about £3.2 bn) from external investors, prompting a swift narrative that FIFA is effectively selling a slice of the World Cup itself.
Within 24 hours, three of FIFA's six continental confederations had publicly condemned the proposal, and a number of national associations followed suit, lamenting that they had not been consulted before the plan was leaked. Support for the move has been marginal at best.
Money has always been at the heart of FIFA's operations, and this latest plan is no exception. But what exactly does the organisation intend to do, how does this compare with other sports bodies, and why has the reaction been so hostile? FFE is presented as a purpose‑built commercial entity designed to maximise FIFA's earnings from sponsorship, broadcasting rights and event management.
According to valuation work commissioned from JP Morgan Chase, FIFA believes the new company could be worth $20 billion. The proposed equity offering of 21 per cent would therefore generate $4.2 billion for the governing body. To proceed, FIFA must obtain the approval of a majority of its 211 member associations as well as the 37‑member FIFA Council, chaired by President Gianni Infantino.
The financial incentive for the members is far larger than the $4.2 billion itself. FIFA is promising a $10 billion development fund for the 2027‑2030 cycle – a dramatic increase from the $3.86 billion earmarked for development in the current 2023‑2026 period.
That $10 billion package includes both the proceeds from the equity sale and additional money drawn from existing FIFA programmes. Under the Forward 4.0 plan, each of the 211 national associations would receive roughly $20 million over the next four years, and a further $20 million would be available through a new optional scheme called FIFA Fast‑Forward. The Fast‑Forward funds are contingent on members opting in by 19 September, effectively making participation a condition of the equity sale. Those who miss the deadline would forfeit the extra cash.
The rapid leak of the proposal before FIFA could formally present it left many questions unanswered. A FAQ released on Wednesday attempted to clarify the mechanics. The $10 billion development pot is split as follows: $4.22 billion for the 211 members via Forward 4.0, another $4.22 billion via Fast‑Forward, and the remaining $1.56 billion from FIFA's existing development programmes.
However, the document omitted any mention of how the six continental confederations – each normally receiving $15 million per year – would be affected. In the current cycle those confederations are allocated $360 million, while other regional bodies receive $76 million. The new allocation leaves only $273 million for them, a shortfall that has raised eyebrows. FIFA defends the move by pointing to similar transactions in other sports.
In 2021, Spain's La Liga sold future broadcast and commercial rights to private‑equity firm CVC for more than €2 billion. UEFA operates UC3, a joint venture that manages the commercial aspects of its European competitions, though that entity has not been sold to outside investors. Critics note that those examples are not perfect analogues – UC3 remains under UEFA control, and Formula 1 is a for‑profit enterprise whose owners benefit directly from commercial gains. The key distinction is FIFA's not‑for‑profit status.
By its statutes, FIFA exists to promote football worldwide, fostering education, cultural exchange and humanitarian values. This mission is at odds with the profit‑driven motives of private equity. Moreover, FIFA enjoys a low effective tax rate – roughly five per cent on its pre‑tax surplus of $1.24 billion in recent years – a benefit that could be jeopardised if a commercial arm were spun off to profit‑seeking investors.
The FAQ attempts to answer what investors would receive for their $4.2 billion. It states they would own a non‑controlling stake in FFE that could be sold in future tender processes overseen by FIFA. However, the stake confers no voting rights on the FIFA Council, no influence over World Cup format or frequency, and no entitlement to dividends. In essence, investors would be buying a ticket to a future resale market without any guaranteed cash flow, a proposition that many observers find puzzling.
The process itself has been criticised for its lack of consultation. Sources close to FIFA say the leadership faced a dilemma: provide a detailed proposal and risk being dismissed as unserious, or push a vague plan that could be portrayed as a fait accompli. The identification of a potential lead investor before any member association had been consulted has further fueled suspicion. That prospective investor is believed to be Joshua Kushner, founder of Thrive Capital, who leads the vehicle Thrive Eternal.
Kushner is the brother‑in‑law of former President Donald Trump’s son‑in‑law, Jared Kushner, creating a political link that has drawn additional scrutiny. While Thrive Capital has donated to Democratic causes, the optics of a Trump‑adjacent figure potentially gaining a foothold in world football have not helped FIFA’s public image. Beyond the optics, the core controversy revolves around the World Cup itself.
The tournament is a global cultural phenomenon, and its commercial rights have traditionally been held by a nonprofit governing body. Selling a portion of those rights to private equity could fundamentally alter the balance between sport and commerce. There are also concerns about transparency.
Although FIFA claims the increased Forward payments will benefit every member association, many national federations have been criticized for opaque accounting of World Cup revenues. The promise of larger cash infusions does not automatically translate into better governance or clearer financial reporting.
Proponents argue that separating commercial activities into a focused entity could improve efficiency and generate higher long‑term revenues, which would then be redistributed to members. Yet the same FAQ notes that even without the equity sale, FIFA expects FFE to deliver $4.2 billion in Forward payments for 2027‑2030, $4.6 billion for 2031‑2034 and $5.1 billion for 2035‑2038.
This raises the question of why external capital is needed at all if the internal restructuring alone could achieve the same financial upside. Critics also point out that the Fast‑Forward programme, which conditions the $20 million per association on opting in by a specific deadline, resembles a pressure tactic rather than a voluntary development initiative. The urgency of the timeline, coupled with the identification of a lead investor, suggests a desire to lock in capital quickly rather than to engage in a measured, inclusive process.
In summary, FIFA's proposal to sell a 21 per cent stake in its new commercial subsidiary has sparked a fierce debate. Supporters see a path to greater revenue and enhanced development funding for all 211 members.
Opponents warn that the move threatens the nonprofit ethos of world football, could diminish transparency, and may ultimately benefit private investors more than the sport itself. The final vote by member associations and the FIFA Council will determine whether the plan proceeds, but the controversy highlights the delicate balance between commercial ambition and the governing principles that have traditionally underpinned the beautiful game.