The Financial Times broke the story on Tuesday that FIFA is gearing up to divest a portion of its commercial arm, a revelation that sent shockwaves through the global football community. The governing body intends to sell a 21 percent interest in a newly created subsidiary called FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE), which will house all of FIFA's commercial activities and major events, including the World Cup – the tournament that, as recently highlighted by The Athletic, remains the primary revenue generator for the organisation. The plan aims to raise roughly $4.2 billion (£3.2 billion) from outside investors, prompting a swift narrative that FIFA is effectively putting a part of the World Cup up for sale. Within 24 hours, three of FIFA’s six continental confederations had publicly condemned the proposal, and numerous national associations – many of which were not consulted before the news leaked – echoed the criticism.
Support for the move has been marginal at best. Money has always been at the heart of FIFA’s agenda, but what exactly does the plan entail? How does it compare with similar initiatives in other sports, and why has it provoked such a fierce backlash?
FFE is presented as a purpose‑built vehicle designed to maximise FIFA’s earnings from commercial deals and event hosting. Using valuation models from JP Morgan Chase, FIFA estimates that FFE could be worth $20 billion. A 21‑percent stake would therefore fetch the targeted $4.2 billion, which the organisation plans to use as a one‑off cash injection.
To approve the transaction, a majority of the 211 member associations must sign off, as must the 37‑member FIFA Council chaired by President Gianni Infantino. However, the $4.2 billion itself is not the only incentive offered to members. FIFA is also promising a $10 billion development fund for the 2027‑2030 cycle – a dramatic increase from the $3.86 billion allocated for the current 2023‑2026 period, which itself had only been set to rise by $127 million under the original budget.
That $10 billion figure encompasses all development spending, not just the Forward programme. FIFA’s Forward initiative, which was front‑and‑centre of Tuesday’s announcement, claims the new funding will instantly benefit every one of the 211 member associations.
Yet the accompanying FAQ released on Wednesday omitted any reference to the six continental confederations, leaving questions about how their annual $15 million allocations (totaling $60 million over four years) fit into the revised financial model. When Infantino took office in 2016, one of his key pledges was to increase the financial support each national federation receives. At that time, members were allocated roughly $3 million per four‑year cycle.
Forward 1.0 (2016‑18) lifted that to $3.75 million, Forward 2.0 (2019‑22) nearly doubled it to $6 million, and Forward 3.0 (through 2026) guarantees at least $8 million. The upcoming Forward 4.0, covering 2027‑2030, is set to deliver just under $10 million per association. The new proposal dwarfs those figures. FIFA intends to grant each member $40 million over the next four years – $20 million via Forward 4.0 and an additional $20 million through a brand‑new optional scheme called FIFA Fast‑Forward.
Multiplying the second $20 million by 211 members yields the $4.2 billion the equity sale is meant to raise. Fast‑Forward has sparked further controversy because eligibility depends on associations opting in by 19 September; those that miss the deadline will forfeit the extra funds. UEFA summed up the situation in a brief statement: “This says everything you need to know about this plan.” The premature leak of the plan before FIFA could formally present it left many details ambiguous, prompting the FAQ to address the most pressing queries.
One such question asks how a $4.2 billion equity sale translates into a $10 billion development pot. The answer is that the $4.2 billion would come directly from the sale, while the remaining $5.8 billion would be drawn from existing allocations and projected revenue growth generated by the creation of FFE. FIFA argues that a dedicated commercial entity, separated from its governing functions, will unlock higher broadcast and sponsorship revenues, potentially exceeding the $15 billion currently forecast for the 2023‑2026 cycle.
Under the new model, the Forward budget for 2027‑2030 would rise from $2.7 billion to at least $4.2 billion, reflecting the $20 million per member payout. Over the subsequent cycles, FIFA projects member payments to climb to $22 million (2031‑34) and $24 million (2035‑38), meaning that across three cycles each association could receive roughly $86 million – almost five times the average annual grant received during Forward’s first decade.
Even without the equity sale, FIFA believes that spinning off commercial operations into a stand‑alone, profit‑oriented entity will generate sufficient cash flow to fund $4.2 billion in Forward payments for 2027‑2030, $4.6 billion for 2031‑2034, and $5.1 billion for 2035‑2038. For many smaller federations, such sums would be transformative. Take Mauritius, whose non‑FIFA revenue in 2025 was a modest $0.4 million; a $20 million Fast‑Forward grant plus $5 million from Forward 4.0 would mean that nearly 98 percent of its total income would derive from FIFA.
However, the FAQ also reveals a glaring omission: the $10 billion pot allocates $4.22 billion each to the 211 members via Forward 4.0 and Fast‑Forward, leaving only $1.56 billion for all other development programmes. In the current cycle, the six confederations together receive $360 million and other regional bodies $76 million – a combined $436 million, which exceeds the remaining $273 million by $163 million.
This discrepancy has raised concerns about the fairness of the distribution. FIFA defends its approach by pointing to similar transactions in other sports.
In 2021, La Liga sold future broadcasting rights to private‑equity firm CVC for over €2 billion (about $2.4 billion). UEFA, a frequent critic, operates UC 3, a joint commercial venture that manages European competition rights, though it has not sold equity to private investors. Critics note that Formula 1 operates as a fully commercial enterprise, with profits flowing to a small group of owners, whereas FIFA is a not‑for‑profit organisation whose statutes obligate it to promote football worldwide and uphold humanitarian values.
FIFA’s non‑profit status grants it tax advantages; over the past decade the organisation generated a pre‑tax surplus of $1.241 billion but paid only $66 million in tax, an effective rate of about five percent. How a profit‑seeking vehicle like FFE would fit within that framework remains unclear.
FIFA insists that the equity sale would not confer any governance rights – investors would hold a non‑controlling stake, have no seat on the FIFA Council, and would not influence decisions about the World Cup’s format, frequency, or expansion. Yet the FAQ offers little reassurance about what investors actually receive besides the potential to sell their stake in future FIFA‑overseen tenders. The process has also been criticised for its lack of consultation. A source close to FIFA, who asked to remain anonymous, explained that the organisation faced a dilemma: present a detailed plan and risk being dismissed as unrealistic, or release a vague proposal that could be portrayed as a fait accompli.
The identification of a lead investor before any member vote – reportedly Joshua Kushner’s Thrive Eternal – has only deepened suspicions. Kushner, brother‑in‑law to former President Donald Trump, has political ties that many view as incongruent with FIFA’s global mission, even though his investment vehicle has made donations to Democratic causes.
Beyond the optics, the core controversy centres on the notion that a portion of the World Cup – the sport’s most lucrative event – could end up under private control. If the commercial rights are sold to the highest bidder, the governing body’s independence could be compromised, and the promised development funds might become secondary to investors’ profit motives. In summary, FIFA’s proposal seeks to raise $4.2 billion by selling a minority stake in a new commercial subsidiary, promising a $10 billion development boost for member associations.
While the financial upside for many federations is undeniable, the plan raises serious questions about transparency, the treatment of confederations, the role of private capital in a not‑for‑profit sport, and the long‑term implications for the World Cup’s governance. The ultimate decision will rest with the member associations, and their vote will determine whether this ambitious, and contentious, restructuring proceeds.