The Financial Times broke the story on Tuesday, revealing that FIFA intends to off‑load a portion of its commercial arm, a move that sent shockwaves through the football community. The governing body plans to sell a 21 percent interest in a newly created subsidiary called FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE), which will house all of its commercial activities and event‑related operations, including the World Cup – the tournament that, as highlighted by The Athletic, remains the primary revenue generator for the organisation. The goal of the transaction is to raise roughly $4.2 billion (about £3.2 billion) from external investors, and the headline quickly turned into a simple narrative: FIFA is selling a slice of the World Cup.
The backlash was immediate. By Wednesday night, half of FIFA’s six continental confederations had publicly condemned the plan, and numerous national associations – many of which were not consulted before the news leaked – also voiced strong opposition. Support for the proposal has been limited to a small minority.
Money has always been at the heart of FIFA’s agenda, and the proposed deal raises several questions: What exactly does FIFA intend to do with the sale? How does this compare with similar arrangements in other sports or within football itself?
And why has the reaction been so hostile? FIFA has framed its case with big numbers.
The FFE entity is presented as a purpose‑built vehicle designed to capture the maximum commercial value from FIFA’s events and sponsorships. Using valuation models from JP Morgan Chase, FIFA estimates that FFE will be worth $20 billion, and it hopes to sell a 21‑percent stake for $4.2 billion. To move forward, FIFA must obtain the approval of a majority of its 211 member associations as well as the 37‑member FIFA Council, chaired by President Gianni Infantino. The financial incentive for the members is not just the $4.2 billion raised; it is the promise of a massive increase in development funding.
FIFA is proposing to allocate $10 billion for development over the 2027‑2030 cycle – a dramatic rise from the $3.86 billion budgeted for the current 2023‑2026 cycle, which itself had only been slated to increase by $127 million under the original 2027‑2030 plan. Those $10 billion encompass all development resources, not solely the Forward programme.
The Forward initiative, which FIFA highlighted in its announcement, is intended to deliver immediate funding boosts to every one of the 211 member associations. Notably absent from both the initial announcement and a subsequent FAQ released by FIFA were the six continental confederations, leaving many to wonder how the new financial model will affect them. Currently, each confederation receives $15 million per year – $60 million over a four‑year period – but the new statements only detailed allocations for the individual members, who will ultimately vote on the sale.
Historically, the development money per association has risen steadily under Infantino’s leadership. Before his 2016 election, each nation received roughly $3 million per four‑year cycle.
Forward 1.0 (2016‑18) lifted that to $3.75 million, Forward 2.0 (2019‑22) nearly doubled it to $6 million, and Forward 3.0 (through 2026) guarantees at least $8 million per cycle. The upcoming Forward 4.0 for 2027‑2030 is set to deliver just under $10 million to each member.
The new proposal dwarfs these figures. FIFA is offering each of the 211 members $40 million over the next four years – $20 million from Forward 4.0 and an additional $20 million from a brand‑new optional programme called FIFA Fast‑Forward. Multiplying that extra $20 million by 211 yields the $4.2 billion that FIFA hopes to raise through the equity sale.
Fast‑Forward has sparked further controversy because it is only available to members who opt in by 19 September; those who miss the deadline will not receive the funds. UEFA summed up the situation succinctly, stating that the FAQ “says everything you need to know about this plan.” The premature leak of the plan before FIFA could formally present it left many questions unanswered, prompting the FAQ document to address several key points. One of the most pressing was how a $4.2 billion equity sale translates into a $10 billion development pot. FIFA’s answer is that the $4.2 billion will come directly from the sale, while the remaining $5.8 billion will be a mix of existing allocations and projected revenue growth generated by the creation of FFE.
The governing body argues that a dedicated commercial entity, separate from the sport‑governing functions, will unlock higher revenues than the $15 billion currently expected for the 2023‑2026 cycle. Under the new model, FIFA anticipates that Forward funding for 2027‑2030 will rise to at least $4.2 billion – $20 million per member – and that this amount will continue to climb in subsequent cycles: $4.6 billion for 2031‑2034 and $5.1 billion for 2035‑2038. Even without the equity sale, FIFA believes that the standalone commercial arm will generate enough cash flow to fund these increased payments. For many smaller associations, the proposal represents a lifeline.
Take the Mauritius Football Association, whose non‑FIFA revenue in 2025 was only $0.4 million. If Mauritius were to participate in Fast‑Forward and receive the full $20 million, plus $5 million from Forward 4.0, FIFA‑derived income would account for roughly 98 percent of its total revenue – a transformative injection of funds. However, the FAQ also exposed a shortfall for the continental confederations and regional bodies.
The $10 billion development pot is broken down into $4.22 billion for the 211 members via Forward 4.0, another $4.22 billion via Fast‑Forward, and the remaining $1.56 billion from existing development programmes. In the current 2023‑2026 cycle, the six confederations were allocated $360 million and other regional bodies $76 million – a total of $436 million. The $273 million left in the new pot for these entities is therefore insufficient, raising concerns about the fairness of the distribution.
FIFA defends the plan by pointing to similar moves in other sports. In 2021, La Liga sold future broadcast rights to private‑equity firm CVC for over €2 billion (about $2.4 billion). UEFA runs a joint commercial venture, UC3, to manage its European competition rights, though it has not sold any equity to external investors.
Formula 1, by contrast, is a fully commercial enterprise where private owners reap the bulk of the profits. The key distinction is that FIFA is a not‑for‑profit organisation, mandated by its statutes to promote football worldwide and uphold its educational, cultural, and humanitarian values. This status affords FIFA tax advantages – over the past decade the organisation’s pre‑tax surplus of $1.241 billion generated only $66 million in tax, an effective rate of about five percent. How a profit‑seeking entity like FFE would fit within this framework remains unclear.
FIFA has emphasized that the stake sale would not grant investors any control over the sport, yet investors would receive a non‑controlling share in FFE that they could later sell in FIFA‑overseen tender processes. Critics argue that offering a $4.2 billion price tag for a stake that provides no voting rights, no dividend income, and no influence over the World Cup’s format or frequency is unreasonable.
The process has also been criticised for its lack of consultation. Many member associations feel the plan was imposed without adequate dialogue, leading to accusations of a “fait accompli” approach. Adding to the suspicion is the early identification of a potential lead investor before any members were consulted. Reports suggest that the investor, Joshua Kushner – head of Thrive Eternal and brother‑in‑law of former U.S.
President Donald Trump – was positioned as the frontrunner. While Kushner’s firm has donated to Democratic causes, the political connections have further fueled concerns about the motives behind the deal. Beyond the politics, the fundamental worry for many is that selling a slice of the World Cup – the sport’s most lucrative and globally unifying event – to private capital could undermine the principle that football’s biggest tournament should remain under the stewardship of a non‑profit body.
Critics also highlight transparency issues: while FIFA publishes how Forward funds are allocated, many national associations lack robust public disclosure of how they spend the money, making it difficult to assess whether the promised influx of cash will be used effectively. In summary, FIFA’s proposal seeks to raise $4.2 billion by selling a 21‑percent stake in a new commercial subsidiary, promising an unprecedented $10 billion development fund for its members over the next four years. The plan promises dramatically higher payouts to individual associations, but it raises serious questions about the adequacy of funding for confederations, the lack of investor control, the speed of the rollout, and the potential erosion of football’s not‑for‑profit ethos. As the vote among the 211 members approaches, the football world watches closely to see whether the financial windfall will outweigh the concerns about governance, transparency, and the long‑term integrity of the sport’s most iconic competition.