Liverpool's summer transfer window saw a staggering outlay that eclipsed the previous year's spending, with more than £200 million added to the club's coffers. Yet, despite the financial firepower, manager Andoni Iraola walks away from the window with a roster that feels uneven and riddled with unanswered questions. Veteran pundit Jamie Carragher summed up the unease on Sky Sports, noting, "It does not look like a balanced squad. Liverpool are short in the full‑back areas and probably a midfield player as well." This blunt assessment rings true even after the club splashed £123 million on French winger Bradley Barcola from Paris Saint‑Germain.

Barcola's arrival was meant to address a glaring void left by the departure of Mohamed Salah, arguably the Premier League's most lethal left‑footed right‑winger in recent memory. Instead of a like‑for‑like replacement, Liverpool have stocked the opposite flank, creating a lopsided attacking shape. Carragher highlighted the problem, saying, "Liverpool have not got a real out‑and‑out right‑sided attacker.

We have not got anybody with a left foot on that right side, like Mo Salah. I am disappointed. I am not quite sure what we are going to do on that right wing right now." Barcola is undeniably versatile, capable of drifting inside or cutting in from either side, but his hefty price tag suggests he should be deployed where he can make the biggest impact. In practice, he is more likely to feature on the left, a position currently occupied by Cody Gakpo, while the left side has seen the likes of Florian Wirtz and Hugo Ekitike in the past.

Young prospect Rio Ngumoha, who broke through on the left last season, was trialled on the opposite wing during pre‑season, and Victor Muñoz—signed after a single top‑flight season as a left winger—also appears a candidate for the right flank. The resulting mosaic of options underscores the lack of a clear, specialist solution for the right‑wing role.

Beyond the attack, the squad's composition reveals deeper structural gaps. When Jeremie Frimpong arrived last summer, Liverpool were careful to stress that he was not a direct replacement for Trent Alexander‑Arnold at right‑back.

Yet, in the opening two league fixtures, Frimpong found himself occupying that very position, filling in for an injured Conor Bradley. While Frimpong is arguably the most naturally suited player for the role at the moment, the club has also floated the idea of using Dominik Szoboszlai or even a centre‑back in an emergency, a compromise that runs counter to the high‑intensity, overlapping full‑back system Iraola favours.

The importance of full‑backs in Iraola's philosophy cannot be overstated. Both Frimpong and Milos Kerkez rank among the Premier League's top three sprint performers this season, trailing only Adrien Truffert of Bournemouth— I raola's former club.

Their relentless up‑and‑down runs are a cornerstone of the team's offensive thrust, but they also leave vast spaces behind them for opponents to exploit. In Liverpool's first two matches, the full‑backs surged forward while the centre‑backs sat deep, creating a midfield vacuum that Newcastle United ruthlessly capitalised on to find the net. Midfield depth is another glaring concern. Ryan Gravenberch, whose contributions helped Arne Slot clinch the Eredivisie title, now finds himself shouldering the creative burden in a side where Alexis Mac Allister's physical influence has waned over the past 18 months.

Iraola's preferred midfield shape, honed at Bournemouth, emphasises aggressive pressing and high‑up ball recovery. As Tyler Adams remarked, "The players really believe that we are going to win the ball high up the field." Yet, with the current personnel, that high‑press may leave the back line exposed, especially when the full‑backs are caught high up the pitch.

Carragher voiced the same worry, stating, "I do not believe that midfield can function with the personnel in there. For me, it does not work.

And it is not just about personnel, it is the structure the manager is asking for." The lack of a true holding midfielder to shield the defence while the full‑backs bomb forward is a structural flaw that could be exploited by well‑organised opponents. Is there a remedy without further spending? Iraola will likely need to make tactical compromises. Carragher suggested a more measured approach: "You do not want to lose the offensive side, the fluidity, the arrivals with numbers, but obviously we were punished the other day, especially in the first goal.

We did not do a proper lockdown. But there is a balance. We cannot go from one way where we send a lot of people forward to keeping everyone back so we do not arrive with numbers." The solution may lie in better game management—recognising when to hold back and when to unleash the attacking thrust.

Players with a keen sense of positional awareness can decide to stay deeper when the team is vulnerable, preserving shape and preventing counter‑attacks. As Carragher put it, "There are players that are very good at smelling the danger. 'I cannot risk going now.

I think I have to stay.' Recognising those situations is the job." In the short term, Liverpool are likely to settle for high‑scoring draws, a pattern that mirrors their current imbalance: moments of attacking brilliance offset by defensive frailties. Whether the squad's strengths will ultimately outweigh its weaknesses remains to be seen. What is clear is that this is the most expensive Liverpool squad ever assembled, and also arguably the most uneven in a decade.

Fans can hope that the quality of the individual signings will eventually gel into a cohesive unit, but until then, the team will continue to be an exciting yet imperfect collection of talent, teetering on the edge between triumph and disappointment.