Liverpool have splashed more cash this summer than they did in the previous transfer window, exceeding £200 million in total outlays. Despite that massive investment, manager Andoni Iraola is left with a roster that many observers feel still lacks equilibrium. Jamie Carragher summed up the situation on Sky Sports, noting, "It does not look like a balanced squad. Liverpool are short in the full‑back areas and probably a midfield player as well." His comment captures the unease that lingers even after the club secured the £123 million signing of Bradley Barcola from Paris Saint‑Germain.
Barcola’s arrival, while impressive on paper, highlights the same structural dilemma. Liverpool have lost Mohamed Salah, arguably the best right‑footed left‑winger in Premier League history, and have attempted to replace him by bolstering the opposite side of the attack. Carragher argued that Liverpool now lack a true specialist for the right‑hand side of the front line, saying, "We have not got anybody with a left foot on that right side, like Mo Salah.
I am disappointed. I am not quite sure what we are going to do on that right wing right now." In other words, the club has poured money into a player whose natural position is on the left, yet the right flank remains a glaring void.
Barcola is a versatile attacker who can operate across the front three, but the size of his fee suggests he should be deployed where he can make the biggest impact. Placing him on the right would be a stretch, as his preferred foot is left.
So far, Cody Gakpo has been used on the left, a role previously filled by Florian Wirtz and Hugo Ekitike at other clubs. Rio Ngumoha, who broke through on the left last season, has been tried on the opposite wing in pre‑season, while Victor Muñoz, signed after a single top‑flight season as a left winger, also appears to be a left‑side option. The net result is a roster that is heavily weighted toward left‑wing talent while the right side remains under‑served. This imbalance does not, on its own, condemn Liverpool’s recruitment policy.
It is more a curiosity than a catastrophe, but fans are understandably nervous about the gaps elsewhere in the squad. The team looks over‑stocked in some areas and severely lacking in others, a situation that could prove costly over a 38‑game league campaign. When Jeremie Frimpong arrived last summer, Liverpool stressed that he was not intended to be a direct replacement for Trent Alexander‑Arnold at right‑back.
Nevertheless, Frimpong has been deployed in that position in the opening two league matches, largely because Conor Bradley is sidelined with injury. Some have suggested using Dominik Szoboszlai further back as a makeshift full‑back, but that would be a compromise that undermines the importance of full‑backs in Iraola’s system, which relies heavily on width and high‑tempo runs.
Data from the first two games illustrate the tactical strain. Both Frimpong and Milos Kerkez rank among the top three Premier League players for total sprints, a testament to the physical demands placed on Liverpool’s wide defenders. The only player ahead of them is Adrien Truffert of Bournemouth, Iraola’s former club, underscoring how crucial pace is to Iraola’s philosophy. Comparing Liverpool’s average player positions in these opening fixtures with those of the title‑winning Bournemouth side under Arne Slot reveals a stark contrast.
Bournemouth’s full‑backs frequently surged forward together, creating overloads and forcing midfielders to cover the space they vacated. Liverpool’s full‑backs are similarly adventurous, but the midfield trio lacks the defensive robustness to plug the gaps left behind. In the first match, Newcastle United exploited this exact weakness, scoring after a quick transition that found a space between the high‑lying full‑backs and the deep‑lying centre‑backs. The midfield problem is especially acute given the decline in physicality of key players like Alexis Mac Allister over the past 18 months.
Ryan Gravenberch, who was instrumental in Slot’s title win, may not be able to shoulder the same defensive burden under Iraola’s high‑pressing, counter‑pressing approach. Moreover, Iraola’s preferred structure does not feature a traditional holding midfielder; at Bournemouth he asked his midfielders to engage aggressively high up the pitch, a tactic that worked when the team possessed ample athleticism and depth. Tyler Adams echoed this sentiment, stating that the players “really believe that we are going to win the ball high up the field.” Carragher has already voiced his doubts, saying, "I do not believe that midfield can function with the personnel in there.
For me, it does not work. And it is not just about personnel, it is the structure the manager is asking for." The early signs support his view: within five minutes of Liverpool’s first Premier League game, the defence was exposed because the full‑backs pushed forward while the centre‑backs sat deep, leaving a vacuum in midfield that Newcastle capitalised on. Virgil van Dijk’s tendency to sit back further compounds the issue. If the full‑backs continue to bomb up the flanks and the centre‑back line remains deep, Liverpool will regularly be vulnerable to quick transitions.
The club now possesses its most expensive squad ever, yet the most glaring structural flaw may be the lack of a balanced midfield and a reliable right‑wing option. Finding a solution without entering the transfer market will require compromises. Carragher suggested that the team must retain its attacking fluidity while tightening its defensive shape: "You do not want to lose the offensive side, the fluidity, the arrivals with numbers, but obviously we were punished the other day, especially in the first goal. We did not do a proper lockdown.
But there is a balance. We cannot go from one way where we send a lot of people forward to keeping everyone back so we do not arrive with numbers.
I do not want to tell Ryan Gravenberch not to carry the ball or arrive in the box. It is a matter of identifying the situation. You cannot be with the joystick every time [controlling] the player.
There are players that are very good at smelling the danger. 'I cannot risk going now. I think I have to stay.' Recognising those situations is the job." In practical terms, this means developing a more nuanced game plan that allows the full‑backs to retreat when necessary, perhaps by rotating a midfielder into a temporary defensive shield or by instructing the centre‑backs to step up slightly to narrow the space. It also means finding a creative solution for the right wing, whether by retraining a left‑footed player to cut inside, converting a versatile forward like Barcola to a more central role, or giving a chance to a younger prospect who can adapt to the demands of the position.
For now, a couple of high‑scoring draws may be a realistic expectation for this Liverpool side. Their strengths—pace, technical skill, and attacking flair—could still overwhelm many opponents, but the structural weaknesses identified by pundits could also be exploited by well‑organized teams. The squad is undeniably imbalanced and imperfect, yet it also promises an exciting, if unpredictable, season for the Reds and their supporters.