The Financial Times broke the story on Tuesday, revealing that FIFA intends to off‑load a portion of its commercial arm, a move that has ignited shock and fury throughout the football community. The governing body for the sport plans to sell a 21 percent interest in a newly created subsidiary called FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE). This entity will house all of FIFA's commercial activities and event operations—including the World Cup, which The Athletic recently highlighted as the primary revenue engine for the organisation.
The goal of the transaction is to raise roughly $4.2 billion (£3.2 bn) from external investors, prompting a rapid narrative that FIFA is effectively selling a slice of the World Cup itself. Within 24 hours, three of FIFA's six continental confederations publicly denounced the proposal, and a number of national associations followed suit, lamenting that they had not been consulted before the plan leaked. Support for the scheme has been sparse, making the backlash appear almost unanimous.
Money has always been at the heart of FIFA’s operations, but what exactly does the plan entail? How does it stack up against similar arrangements in other sports, and why has it provoked such intense criticism? FFE is presented as a purpose‑built vehicle designed to maximise FIFA’s earnings from commercial deals and event hosting.
Using valuation models from JP Morgan Chase, FIFA estimates that FFE could be worth $20 billion. The 21 percent stake on offer would therefore generate the targeted $4.2 billion in equity capital. To move forward, FIFA must secure approval from a majority of its 211 member associations as well as the 37‑member FIFA Council, chaired by President Gianni Infantino. However, the incentive for members is not merely the $4.2 billion raised; the proposal bundles a massive development package.
FIFA promises $10 billion in development funding for the 2027‑2030 cycle—a dramatic increase from the $3.86 billion allocated for the current 2023‑2026 period, which itself was only a modest $127 million rise over the original budget. Those development funds encompass all of FIFA’s Forward programmes, not just the new Fast‑Forward initiative. The Forward programme has been the cornerstone of FIFA’s financial support to national associations.
When Infantino took office in 2016, he pledged to raise the amount of money each association receives, and the numbers have risen steadily: from roughly $3 million per four‑year cycle before his tenure, to $3.75 million under Forward 1.0 (2016‑18), nearly $6 million under Forward 2.0 (2019‑22), $8 million under Forward 3.0 (2023‑2026), and an anticipated just under $10 million under Forward 4.0 (2027‑2030). The new proposal dwarfs those figures.
Each of the 211 members would be entitled to $40 million over the next four years – $20 million from Forward 4.0 and an additional $20 million from the optional Fast‑Forward programme. Multiplying that extra $20 million by 211 yields the $4.2 billion that FIFA hopes to raise through the equity sale.
Fast‑Forward funds are only available to associations that opt‑in by 19 September, effectively making participation in the equity sale a prerequisite for receiving the extra money. UEFA summed up the controversy in a brief statement: "This says everything you need to know about this plan." The premature leak of the plan left many questions unanswered, prompting FIFA to publish a FAQ document on Wednesday. One key query was how a $4.2 billion equity sale could translate into $10 billion for development.
FIFA’s answer is that the sale will fund the new Fast‑Forward payments while the creation of a commercial‑focused FFE will boost future revenue streams beyond the $15 billion already projected for the 2023‑2026 cycle. The expectation is that a professional, profit‑driven commercial arm, separate from the sport‑governing side, will generate additional cash flow that can be reinvested into development.
Under the new model, Forward payments would rise to $22 million per member for the 2031‑2034 cycle and $24 million for 2035‑2038, meaning that across three cycles members could receive $86 million each – almost five times the average payout they have enjoyed in the first decade of the Forward programme. Even without the equity infusion, FIFA believes that simply spinning off commercial operations into a dedicated entity will yield $4.2 billion for Forward 4.0, $4.6 billion for 2031‑2034, and $5.1 billion for 2035‑2038. For many smaller associations, these sums represent a lifeline. Take the Mauritius Football Association, whose non‑FIFA revenue in 2025 was a modest $0.4 million.
If it participates in Fast‑Forward and receives the full $20 million plus the $5 million from Forward 4.0, FIFA funding would account for 98 percent of its total income. A glaring omission in FIFA’s communications is the impact on the six continental confederations and other regional bodies, which currently receive $15 million each year ($60 million over a four‑year cycle).
The FAQ only details payments to the 211 members, leaving the confederations’ future share unclear. The $10 billion development pot is broken down as follows: $4.22 billion to members via Forward 4.0, $4.22 billion via Fast‑Forward, and $1.56 billion from existing development programmes. The original 2027‑2030 budget allocated $1.287 billion to those existing programmes, implying only $273 million remains for confederations and other recipients – a shortfall when compared with the $360 million the confederations were slated to receive in the current cycle. FIFA defends the plan by pointing to similar transactions in other sports.
In 2021, Spain’s La Liga sold future broadcast rights to private‑equity firm CVC for over €2 billion (about $2.4 billion). UEFA runs UC3, a joint commercial venture for its European competitions, although UC3 has not been sold to external investors.
Critics note that Formula 1, a fully commercial enterprise, is an outlier, driven primarily by private owners rather than a not‑for‑profit mission. FIFA, by contrast, is a non‑profit organisation whose statutes mandate the promotion of football worldwide for its educational, cultural and humanitarian values. This status affords FIFA tax advantages; over the past decade its pre‑tax surplus of $1.241 billion generated only $66 million in tax – an effective rate of about five percent. The question then arises: what will investors receive for their $4.2 billion?
FIFA insists the sale will not grant any governance rights – no seats on the Council, no vote on the World Cup format, and no influence over regulatory matters. The FAQ states investors will hold a non‑controlling stake in FFE that they could later sell in FIFA‑overseen tender processes. Yet without dividends or clear profit‑sharing mechanisms, the financial rationale for investors remains opaque.
The process itself has drawn criticism for its lack of consultation. A source close to FIFA, who asked to remain anonymous, described a dilemma: presenting a vague proposal could be dismissed as unserious, while advancing a detailed plan without member input risked being seen as a fait accompli.
The identification of a lead investor before any member vote has only heightened suspicions. Media reports have linked the prospective lead investor to Joshua Kushner, head of Thrive Eternal, a vehicle allegedly set to lead the investor group.
Kushner is the brother‑in‑law of former President Donald Trump’s son‑in‑law, Jared Kushner, prompting political speculation. While Thrive Capital has donated to Democratic causes, the association with Trump’s circle has fueled narratives that Infantino is leveraging political connections for personal or organisational gain.
Beyond the politics, the core controversy centres on the principle of selling a portion of the World Cup’s commercial rights. The tournament is a global cultural event overseen by a body that, at least officially, is not beholden to private capital. Introducing private equity into that mix could fundamentally alter the sport’s governance and financial priorities. Transparency concerns also loom large.
While FIFA publishes Forward allocations, many national associations provide limited public disclosure of how they spend those funds. The promise of larger payouts does not automatically translate into better oversight or more equitable distribution of World Cup revenues. Finally, the necessity of the external capital is questioned.
FIFA’s own internal analysis suggests that establishing FFE could, on its own, improve revenue streams sufficiently to fund the increased Forward payments. Yet the organisation appears to be seeking a one‑off cash injection to accelerate the rollout of Fast‑Forward, despite having approved a modest Forward budget just months earlier. This urgency, coupled with the conditional nature of the Fast‑Forward funds, raises doubts about the genuine intent behind the programme.
In summary, FIFA’s proposal to sell a 21 percent stake in a newly formed commercial subsidiary aims to raise $4.2 billion, which would be used to dramatically boost development funding for its 211 member associations. While the financial figures are impressive, the plan has been met with widespread criticism due to its lack of transparency, the exclusion of confederations from the discussion, the unclear benefits for private investors, and the broader philosophical question of whether a not‑for‑profit governing body should invite private equity into the heart of the world’s most popular sport. The ultimate decision rests with the member associations, and their vote will determine whether FIFA proceeds with a move that could reshape the financial architecture of global football for years to come.