The Financial Times broke the story on Tuesday, revealing that FIFA intends to offload a portion of its commercial arm, a move that has sparked shock and anger throughout the football community. The governing body plans to sell a 21% interest in a newly created subsidiary called FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE), which will house all of FIFA's commercial and event‑related activities, including the World Cup – the tournament that The Athletic recently highlighted as the primary source of FIFA's revenue.
The goal is to raise roughly $4.2 billion (£3.2 bn) from external investors, and the headline quickly turned into: FIFA is selling part of the World Cup. Criticism arrived almost immediately.
By Wednesday evening, three of FIFA's six continental confederations had publicly condemned the proposal, and a number of national associations – none of which appear to have been consulted before the leak – also voiced strong disapproval. Support for the plan has been limited to a small minority.
Money has always been at the heart of FIFA’s operations, and this plan is no exception. What exactly does FIFA intend to do, how does it compare with similar initiatives in other sports, and why has it provoked such a backlash? FFE is being presented as a purpose‑built vehicle designed to maximise the income FIFA derives from commercial deals and major events. Using valuation work from JPMorgan Chase, FIFA estimates that FFE will eventually be worth $20 billion.
The 21% stake on offer would therefore generate the targeted $4.2 billion equity infusion. The sale cannot go ahead without the approval of a majority of FIFA’s 211 member associations and the 37‑person FIFA Council, chaired by President Gianni Infantino.
However, the $4.2 billion itself is not the only incentive being offered to the members. Instead, FIFA promises a $10 billion development fund for the 2027‑2030 cycle – a dramatic increase over the $3.86 billion allocated for development in the current 2023‑2026 period. That $10 billion includes all of FIFA’s development programmes, not just the Forward initiative, which is the centerpiece of the announcement. FIFA argues that the approval of the stake sale will instantly boost funding for every one of its 211 members.
The six continental confederations were notably absent from both the initial announcement and the FAQ document released on Wednesday. Their regular annual allocation of $15 million (or $60 million over four years) is not mentioned, and the new financial model only details what the 211 national associations will receive. This omission has raised concerns about the transparency of the distribution plan. When Infantino took office in 2016, he pledged to increase the financial support given to each member nation, and the numbers have risen steadily.
Before his tenure, each association received roughly $3 million per four‑year cycle. Forward 1.0 (2016‑18) raised that to $3.75 million, Forward 2.0 (2019‑22) to about $6 million, and Forward 3.0 (through 2026) guarantees at least $8 million.
Forward 4.0, covering 2027‑2030, is set to deliver just under $10 million per association. The new proposal dwarfs those figures.
FIFA is offering each of the 211 members $40 million over the next four years – $20 million from Forward 4.0 and an additional $20 million from a brand‑new optional scheme called FIFA Fast‑Forward. Multiplying the extra $20 million by 211 yields the $4.2 billion the equity sale is meant to raise.
Fast‑Forward is controversial because it will only be available to members that opt‑in by 19 September; those that miss the deadline will receive nothing. The premature leak of the plan left many questions unanswered, prompting the FAQ sheet to address the most pressing issues. One key query is how a $4.2 billion equity sale translates into a $10 billion development pot. FIFA explains that the $4.2 billion will come directly from the sale, while the remaining $5.8 billion will be sourced from existing budgets and the anticipated higher revenues generated by FFE’s commercial activities.
FIFA believes that separating commercial and event operations into a dedicated, profit‑driven entity will boost income beyond the $15 billion it expects from the 2023‑2026 cycle. Executives argue that a professionalised business, distinct from the sport‑governing function, will attract larger broadcast deals and sponsorships, thereby funding larger Forward payments not just for the next cycle but for several future cycles as well. They project member payouts of $22 million for 2031‑34 and $24 million for 2035‑38, meaning that over three cycles each association could receive roughly $86 million – almost five times the amount allocated in the first decade of the Forward programme.
Even without the equity sale, FIFA contends that the stand‑alone commercial entity would generate $4.2 billion for Forward 4.0, $4.6 billion for 2031‑34 and $5.1 billion for 2035‑38. For smaller federations, the impact would be enormous.
Take the Mauritius Football Association, whose non‑FIFA revenue in 2025 was only $0.4 million. If it participates in Fast‑Forward and receives the full $20 million plus $5 million from Forward 4.0, FIFA‑derived income would represent 98% of its total earnings. The FAQ also revealed how the $10 billion development pool is divided: $4.22 billion goes to the 211 members via Forward 4.0, another $4.22 billion through Fast‑Forward, and the remaining $1.56 billion comes from FIFA’s existing development programmes. However, the allocation for confederations appears insufficient.
The 2027‑30 budget originally earmarked $1.287 billion for these programmes; after the new split, only $273 million would remain for confederations and regional bodies, far less than the $360 million they received in the 2023‑26 cycle, suggesting a shortfall of roughly $163 million. FIFA defends the plan by pointing to similar transactions in other sports. In 2021, La Liga sold future broadcasting rights to private‑equity firm CVC for more than €2 billion, and UEFA operates UC3, a joint commercial venture for its European competitions. Critics note, however, that UC3 has not been sold to external investors, and that Formula 1 operates as a fully commercial, profit‑seeking enterprise, unlike FIFA, which is a not‑for‑profit organisation mandated to promote football worldwide.
As a not‑for‑profit, FIFA enjoys a low effective tax rate – roughly five percent on its pre‑tax surplus of $1.241 billion over the past decade – and it does not pay dividends. This raises the question of what external investors would receive in return for a $4.2 billion purchase of a non‑controlling stake in FFE. FIFA’s FAQ states that investors would hold a share in FFE that could be sold in future tender processes overseen by FIFA, but no dividends, voting rights, or influence over the World Cup’s format or frequency would be granted. The lack of clear financial upside makes the valuation appear dubious to many observers.
The process has also been criticised for its top‑down nature. FIFA moved forward without consulting its members, leading to accusations of a “fait accompli” approach.
An unnamed source close to the organisation suggested that presenting a vague proposal would make it seem unserious, while a more detailed plan risked rejection – a dilemma that has resulted in a rushed, opaque rollout. Complicating matters further, the identity of the lead investor has become a political flashpoint.
Reports indicate that Joshua Kushner, head of the investment vehicle Thrive Eternal, is expected to lead the investor group. Kushner’s brother‑in‑law is Donald Trump’s son‑in‑law, and the connection has been seized upon by critics who view the partnership as evidence of Infantino’s willingness to align football with politically charged figures. Beyond politics, the core controversy remains the potential sale of a slice of the World Cup – a global event historically managed by a body that, at least on paper, is not beholden to private capital.
Allowing private equity to own a stake, even a non‑controlling one, could alter the sport’s governance and commercial landscape forever. In summary, FIFA’s proposal seeks to raise $4.2 billion by selling a minority stake in a new commercial subsidiary, promising a $10 billion development fund that would dramatically increase payments to national associations. While the financial upside for members is clear, the plan raises serious questions about transparency, the role of confederations, the value offered to investors, and the broader implications of introducing private‑equity influence into football’s most iconic tournament. The final vote by the member associations will determine whether the plan proceeds or is abandoned.