The Financial Times broke the story on Tuesday, revealing that FIFA is gearing up to divest a portion of its commercial arm, a move that has ignited shock and fury throughout the football community. The governing body intends to sell a 21% interest in a newly created subsidiary, FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE), which will house all of its commercial activities and event‑related operations—including the World Cup, the tournament that The Athletic recently identified as the primary revenue engine for the organisation. The goal is to raise roughly $4.2 billion (£3.2 bn) from external investors, prompting a swift narrative that FIFA is effectively putting the World Cup up for sale. The backlash was immediate.
By Wednesday evening, half of FIFA’s six continental confederations had publicly condemned the proposal, and numerous national associations—none of which appear to have been consulted before the news leaked—joined the criticism. Only a handful of voices have expressed support, making the dissent the dominant response.
Money has always been at the heart of FIFA’s agenda, but what exactly does the plan entail? How does it stack up against similar initiatives in other sports and within football itself?
And why has it provoked such intense controversy? FIFA’s pitch is built around big numbers. The new entity, FFE, is described as a purpose‑built vehicle designed to maximise the federation’s take from commercial deals and event revenue.
Using valuation models from JP Morgan Chase, FIFA estimates that FFE could be worth $20 billion. A 21% slice of that valuation translates into the $4.2 billion equity raise it is seeking from investors.
To move forward, FIFA must obtain approval from the majority of its 211 member associations as well as the 37‑member FIFA Council, chaired by President Gianni Infantino. However, the $4.2 billion cash infusion is not the only carrot on the table for the members. Instead, FIFA is promising a $10 billion development fund spread over the 2027‑2030 four‑year cycle. This represents a dramatic increase from the current 2023‑2026 cycle, which allocated $3.86 billion for development, with only a modest $127 million increase originally planned for the next cycle.
The new sum covers all development spending, not just the allocations under the Forward programme, which FIFA highlighted in its announcement as a way to boost football development in every corner of the globe. The announcement and the accompanying FAQ released on Wednesday omitted any reference to the six continental confederations, leaving members uncertain about how the new financial model would affect them.
Currently each confederation receives $15 million per year ($60 million over four years). The FAQ only detailed the payouts that would go directly to the 211 member associations, who will ultimately vote on whether to sell the FFE stake. Historically, the amount each national association receives has risen steadily under Infantino’s tenure. Before his election, associations got roughly $3 million per four‑year cycle.
Forward 1.0 (2016‑18) lifted that to $3.75 million, Forward 2.0 (2019‑22) nearly doubled it to $6 million, and Forward 3.0 (through 2026) guarantees at least $8 million. The upcoming Forward 4.0 budget for 2027‑2030 is set to deliver just under $10 million to each member. The new proposal dwarfs those figures.
FIFA intends to grant each of the 211 members $40 million over the next four years—$20 million through Forward 4.0 and another $20 million via a brand‑new optional programme called FIFA Fast‑Forward. Multiplying the optional $20 million by 211 yields the $4.2 billion that the equity sale hopes to generate.
Fast‑Forward has sparked particular unease because participation is contingent on members opting in by 19 September. Those who miss the deadline will not receive the extra funds. UEFA summed up the controversy in a brief statement: "This says everything you need to know about this plan." The premature leak of the plan before FIFA could formally present it left many questions unanswered.
The FAQ attempted to clarify how a $4.2 billion equity sale translates into a $10 billion development pool. The answer is that the $4.2 billion would come directly from the sale, while the remainder would be drawn from existing and projected revenues. FIFA argues that establishing FFE as a stand‑alone commercial entity will boost overall earnings, potentially exceeding the $15 billion it expects from the 2023‑2026 cycle. In concrete terms, $2.7 billion was already earmarked for the Forward programme in 2027‑2030.
Under the new plan, that figure would rise to at least $4.2 billion—$20 million for each member association, plus additional sums for confederations and regional bodies. FIFA projects that the enhanced revenue stream from FFE will fund these higher Forward payouts not only for the next cycle but also for subsequent ones: $22 million per member in 2031‑34 and $24 million in 2035‑38, amounting to $86 million per association over three cycles, roughly five times the average payment in the programme’s first decade.
Even without the equity sale, FIFA believes that separating commercial and event operations into a dedicated entity will generate $4.2 billion for Forward payments in 2027‑30, $4.6 billion in 2031‑34, and $5.1 billion in 2035‑38. For many smaller associations, such as the Mauritius Football Association, which reported non‑FIFA revenue of just $0.4 million in 2025, the proposed $20 million Fast‑Forward infusion would represent a staggering 98% of its total income. However, the plan appears to overlook the confederations and zonal bodies that also rely on Forward funding. The FAQ breaks down the $10 billion pot as follows: $4.22 billion to the 211 members via Forward 4.0, another $4.22 billion via Fast‑Forward, and $1.56 billion from existing development programmes.
The original 2027‑2030 budget allocated $1.287 billion to those existing programmes, leaving only $273 million for the confederations and other regional entities—a sharp reduction compared with the $360 million they received in the current cycle. FIFA defends the move by pointing to similar transactions elsewhere. In 2021, La Liga sold future broadcasting rights to private‑equity firm CVC for more than €2 billion (about $2.4 billion). UEFA runs UC3, a joint venture that manages commercial rights for its European competitions, though UC3 has not been sold to external investors.
Formula 1, rugby unions, and other sports have also embraced private‑capital partnerships, but each case carries unique nuances that make direct comparison difficult. Crucially, FIFA is a not‑for‑profit organisation whose statutes mandate the promotion of football’s educational, cultural and humanitarian values worldwide. This status affords it tax advantages; over the past decade FIFA’s pre‑tax surplus of $1.241 billion generated a tax bill of just $66 million—a 5% effective rate. Introducing a profit‑seeking entity like FFE into the structure raises questions about how investors will be compensated, especially since FIFA insists the sale will not grant any governance rights.
The FAQ states that investors would hold a non‑controlling stake in FFE that could be sold in future tender processes overseen by FIFA, but it offers no clear dividend or profit‑sharing mechanism. The unilateral nature of the proposal has also drawn fire. Many members feel they have been excluded from a decision that could reshape the financial landscape of global football.
An insider close to the negotiations described a dilemma: presenting a vague plan could be seen as unserious, while pushing a detailed, pre‑packaged deal without consultation looks like a fait accompli. The identification of a potential lead investor before any member vote has only deepened suspicions.
That prospective investor is Joshua Kushner, head of Thrive Eternal, which is expected to lead the investor group for FFE. Kushner’s family ties to former President Donald Trump—his brother Jared is Trump’s son‑in‑law—have added a political dimension to the controversy, despite Kushner’s own philanthropic donations to Democratic causes.
Beyond the optics, the core issue remains the sale of a slice of the World Cup’s commercial engine to private capital. The World Cup, despite its flaws, is a global showcase that has historically been under the stewardship of a non‑profit federation. Allowing private equity a foothold could fundamentally alter that relationship. Critics also point out that while the proposed funding boost is substantial, transparency around how World Cup revenues are currently allocated remains limited.
Member associations receive generous Forward payments, yet many do not disclose how those funds are spent, undermining confidence that the new money will be used responsibly. FIFA argues that a dedicated commercial entity will unlock higher broadcast and sponsorship revenues, but the ultimate beneficiaries of private investment are typically the investors themselves, who will expect returns and influence.
The question, then, is whether the promised development benefits outweigh the risk of commercialising a sport that, by statute, should serve the global community rather than private shareholders. In summary, FIFA’s plan seeks $4.2 billion from an equity sale of a 21% stake in a new commercial subsidiary, promising a $10 billion development fund and dramatically increased payments to its 211 members. The proposal has been met with swift condemnation from confederations, national associations, and observers who question the need for external capital, the lack of member consultation, and the potential erosion of football’s not‑for‑profit ethos. The ultimate vote by the member associations will determine whether the sport embraces this commercial pivot or reverts to a more traditional, member‑driven funding model.