The Financial Times broke the story on Tuesday, revealing that FIFA intends to divest a portion of its commercial arm, a move that has sparked shock and fury throughout the football community. The governing body plans to sell a 21% interest in a newly created subsidiary called FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE). This entity will house all of FIFA’s commercial activities and event‑related operations, including the World Cup, which The Athletic has recently highlighted as the primary source of revenue for the organization. The goal of the transaction is to raise roughly $4.2 billion (£3.2 bn) from external investors, and the headline quickly turned into a narrative that FIFA is effectively selling a share of the World Cup itself.
Within 24 hours the reaction was overwhelmingly negative. By Wednesday night three of the six continental confederations had publicly condemned the proposal, and a number of national associations – many of which say they were not consulted before the news leaked – joined the chorus of disapproval. Support for the plan has been limited to a small minority. Money, as always in the world of football, sits at the centre of the debate.
But what exactly does FIFA intend to do with the proposed sale? How does this compare with the commercial strategies of other sports bodies, and why has the announcement provoked such intense controversy? FFE is presented by FIFA as a purpose‑built, profit‑maximising vehicle that will capture all commercial and event‑related income, thereby increasing the share of revenue that flows back to the sport’s global governing body. Using valuation work from JP Morgan Chase, FIFA estimates that FFE will eventually be worth $20 billion.
The 21% stake on offer would therefore generate the $4.2 billion target for the equity raise. To move forward, FIFA must secure the approval of a majority of its 211 member associations as well as the 37‑member FIFA Council, chaired by President Gianni Infantino.
The $4.2 billion in proceeds is not the only incentive being offered to the members. Instead, FIFA is promising a massive boost in development funding – $10 billion over the 2027‑2030 four‑year cycle. This represents a dramatic increase from the $3.86 billion earmarked for development in the current 2023‑2026 cycle, which itself was only a modest $127 million rise over the original 2027‑2030 budget.
The $10 billion pot includes all development resources, not solely the amounts allocated under the FIFA Forward programme. The Forward initiative, which was the vehicle for Tuesday’s announcement, is described by FIFA as a means to ensure that “football development in every corner of the world would benefit immediately from increased funding available to all 211 member associations.” What is missing from both the initial press release and the FAQ document released by FIFA on Wednesday are the six continental confederations. No details were provided about how the new financial model would affect them.
Currently each confederation receives $15 million per year – $60 million over a four‑year period – but the statements only referenced the payouts that would go directly to the 211 national associations, which are the entities that will ultimately vote on the sale. The amounts promised to the national associations are staggering. When Infantino was elected in 2016 he pledged to increase the financial support each member receives, and his administration has largely delivered on that promise. Prior to his tenure, each nation received roughly $3 million per four‑year cycle.
Forward 1.0 (2016‑18) lifted that to $3.75 million, Forward 2.0 (2019‑22) nearly doubled it to $6 million, and Forward 3.0 (through 2026) guarantees at least $8 million. Under the forthcoming Forward 4.0, the figure is set just under $10 million per association. The new proposal dwarfs those numbers.
FIFA is offering each of the 211 members $40 million over the next four years – $20 million through Forward 4.0 and an additional $20 million via a brand‑new optional scheme called FIFA Fast‑Forward. Multiplying the second $20 million by 211 yields the $4.2 billion that FIFA hopes to raise from the equity sale. Fast‑Forward has become a flashpoint because the funds are only available to associations that formally opt‑in by September 19.
Those that miss the deadline will not receive the extra cash. The FAQ also tried to explain how a $4.2 billion equity sale translates into a $10 billion development budget. The answer is that the $4.2 billion would come directly from the sale of the 21% stake in FFE, while the remaining $5.8 billion would be a blend of existing allocations and projected incremental revenue generated by the newly independent commercial entity.
FIFA argues that by separating commercial activities into a professional, profit‑driven business, it will unlock revenues that exceed the $15 billion currently projected for the 2023‑2026 cycle. Under the current plan, the Forward budget for 2027‑2030 would rise from $2.7 billion to at least $4.2 billion, reflecting the $20 million per association payout. In later cycles the numbers climb further: $4.6 billion for 2031‑2034 and $5.1 billion for 2035‑2038.
FIFA claims that even without the equity infusion, the stand‑alone commercial vehicle would generate sufficient cash flow to fund those Forward payments, suggesting that the sale is primarily a mechanism to provide a one‑off cash boost rather than a necessity for long‑term sustainability. For smaller federations the impact would be transformative.
Take the Mauritius Football Association, whose non‑FIFA revenue in 2025 was a modest $0.4 million. If the association participates in Fast‑Forward and receives the full $20 million in 2027, that single payment would represent 98% of its total income, dramatically reshaping its financial landscape.
However, the FAQ reveals a potential shortfall for the continental confederations and regional bodies. The $10 billion development pot is broken down as follows: $4.22 billion to the 211 members via Forward 4.0, another $4.22 billion to the same members via Fast‑Forward, and the remaining $1.56 billion from existing FIFA development programmes. In the original 2027‑2030 budget, $1.287 billion was allocated to those existing programmes. If that figure remains unchanged, only $273 million would be left for confederations and other regional entities.
By contrast, the current 2023‑2026 cycle allocated $360 million to the six confederations and $76 million to other associations – a total $163 million more than the remaining $273 million, indicating a possible funding gap. FIFA defends the plan by pointing to similar transactions in other sports. In 2021, Spain’s La Liga sold future broadcasting rights to private‑equity firm CVC for over €2 billion (about $2.4 billion).
UEFA, a frequent critic of FIFA, runs a joint commercial venture called UC3 to manage the business side of its European competitions. While those examples involve private capital, there are important differences: UC3 has not been sold to external investors, and many of these deals prioritize profit for owners rather than global development. FIFA’s status as a not‑for‑profit organization adds another layer of complexity. Its statutes require it to “improve the game of football constantly and promote it globally in the light of its unifying, educational, cultural and humanitarian values.” The organization enjoys tax advantages – over the past decade FIFA’s pre‑tax surplus of $1.241 billion generated a tax charge of just $66 million, an effective rate of about five percent.
How a commercial spin‑off like FFE, which would presumably be a for‑profit entity, fits into this framework is unclear. FIFA says the equity sale will not give investors any control over the sport – no seats on the Council, no voting rights, and no say over World Cup format or expansion – yet investors would hold a non‑controlling stake that they could later sell in FIFA‑overseen tender processes. Critics argue that paying $4.2 billion for a stake that offers no dividends, no governance influence, and only a vague promise of future value is unreasonable.
The process itself has been criticised for its lack of transparency. Many members feel the plan was pushed through without proper consultation, creating the impression of a fait‑accompli.
An anonymous source close to FIFA suggested that presenting a half‑baked proposal would have been dismissed as unserious, whereas a more advanced plan presented without prior discussion appears to force members into a corner. Adding to the perception of a rushed deal, documents seen by The Athletic indicate that any investor must complete the fund transfer by the end of October, suggesting a desire to accelerate the transaction. The identity of the lead investor has further inflamed the debate. Reports link the prospective buyer to Joshua Kushner, head of Thrive Eternal, a vehicle expected to lead the investor group for FFE.
Kushner is the brother‑in‑law of former President Donald Trump, and the connection has been seized upon by critics who view it as evidence of Infantino’s willingness to align football’s governance with political and business interests. While Kushner’s own political donations lean Democratic, the mere association with the Trump orbit has been enough to fuel suspicion.
Beyond the optics, the core controversy revolves around the principle of selling a slice of the World Cup – the sport’s most lucrative and globally unifying event – to private capital. Even if the additional funding dramatically improves development programmes, the notion that a not‑for‑profit body would allow private investors to profit from the commercial engine of football challenges the ethos of the sport’s worldwide mission. Transparency in the use of Forward funds is already a concern. While FIFA publishes high‑level figures on how much each association receives, many national federations provide limited public disclosure of how those monies are spent.
The promise of larger payouts does not automatically translate into better governance or more effective development projects. FIFA argues that the creation of FFE will enable the organization to capture higher broadcast rights revenues and other commercial streams, which in turn will fund the expanded Forward allocations. Yet the question remains: why does FIFA need a one‑off injection of $4.2 billion if the commercial restructuring alone could eventually generate the required cash flow?
An anonymous source suggested that FIFA could retain 100% ownership of FFE and still reap the long‑term benefits, making the external equity raise appear unnecessary. In summary, the proposal combines a massive increase in development funding with a controversial equity sale that many see as a departure from FIFA’s not‑for‑profit mandate. The plan promises $40 million per member association, a figure that dwarfs previous Forward cycles, but it also raises doubts about the fate of confederations, the true value offered to investors, and the overall transparency of the process.
As the vote among the 211 members approaches, the football world will be watching closely to see whether the promise of unprecedented financial support outweighs the concerns about governance, control, and the commercialization of the sport’s most iconic tournament.