The Financial Times broke the story on Tuesday, revealing that FIFA intends to divest a portion of its commercial arm, a move that has sparked widespread shock and anger throughout the football community. The governing body plans to sell a 21% interest in a newly formed subsidiary called FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE), which will house all commercial activities and events—including the World Cup, the primary revenue generator for FIFA as highlighted by recent reporting from The Athletic. The goal is to raise roughly $4.2 billion (£3.2 billion) from external investors, prompting a swift narrative that FIFA is effectively selling part of the World Cup itself. By Wednesday night, half of FIFA’s six continental confederations and several national associations had publicly condemned the plan, noting that they had not been consulted before the proposal leaked.
Support for the sale has been minimal. Money has always been at the heart of FIFA’s operations, but what exactly does the plan entail? How does it compare with similar initiatives in other sports, and why has it provoked such a backlash? FFE is presented as a purpose‑built vehicle designed to maximise FIFA’s earnings from commercial and event‑related activities.
Using valuation models from JP Morgan Chase, FIFA estimates FFE’s total worth at $20 billion. The proposed equity sale of 21% would therefore generate $4.2 billion for the organisation. To move forward, FIFA needs approval from a majority of its 211 member associations and the 37‑member FIFA Council, chaired by President Gianni Infantino. The incentive offered to the members goes far beyond the $4.2 billion itself.
FIFA is pledging $10 billion in development funding for the 2027‑2030 cycle—an increase from the $3.86 billion allocated for 2023‑2026 and a $127 million uplift over the original 2027‑2030 budget. This new pool includes all development money, not just the amounts earmarked under the Forward programme. The Forward programme, which FIFA highlighted in its announcement, promises that "football development in every corner of the world would benefit immediately from increased funding available to all 211 member associations." Notably absent from the initial press release and the subsequent FAQ document were the six continental confederations.
Their annual $15 million allocation (or $60 million over four years) was not addressed, even though the new financial model focuses on payments to the 211 national associations that will vote on the sale. When Infantino took office in 2016, he pledged to increase financial support to every FIFA member, a promise that has been largely fulfilled.
Prior to his tenure, each nation received about $3 million per four‑year cycle. Forward 1.0 (2016‑18) raised this to $3.75 million, Forward 2.0 (2019‑22) nearly doubled it to $6 million, and Forward 3.0 (through 2026) guarantees at least $8 million per cycle.
The upcoming Forward 4.0 for 2027‑2030 is set to deliver just under $10 million to each association. The new proposal dwarfs those figures.
FIFA intends to give each of the 211 members $40 million over the next four years—$20 million from Forward 4.0 and an additional $20 million from a new optional scheme called FIFA Fast‑Forward. Multiplying the second $20 million by 211 yields the $4.2 billion the equity sale hopes to raise. Fast‑Forward has stirred further controversy because participation is contingent on members opting in by 19 September; those who miss the deadline will not receive the funds.
UEFA summed up the situation with a terse statement: "This says everything you need to know about this plan." The premature leak of the plan left many questions unanswered, prompting FIFA to publish a FAQ sheet on Wednesday. One key query: how does a $4.2 billion equity sale translate into $10 billion for development? The answer lies in a blend of new and existing resources.
The $4.2 billion from the stake sale would be supplemented by the expectation that FFE’s commercial success will generate additional revenue beyond the $15 billion already projected for the 2023‑26 cycle. FIFA argues that a professional, stand‑alone commercial entity—separate from the sport‑governing functions—will unlock greater earnings.
Under the new plan, the Forward budget for 2027‑2030 would rise from $2.7 billion to at least $4.2 billion, reflecting $20 million per member plus additional sums for confederations and regional bodies. FIFA projects that the increased cash flow from FFE will fund these higher Forward payments not only for the upcoming cycle but also for the subsequent ones: $22 million per member in 2031‑34 and $24 million in 2035‑38. Across three cycles, the organisation believes members could receive $86 million each—almost five times the $17 million they have been allocated in the programme’s first decade. Even without the equity infusion, FIFA maintains that the creation of FFE will generate sufficient revenue to fund $4.2 billion in Forward payments for 2027‑30, $4.6 billion for 2031‑34, and $5.1 billion for 2035‑38.
For smaller associations, the impact would be dramatic. Take the Mauritius Football Association, which recorded non‑FIFA revenue of just $0.4 million in 2025. If it opted into Fast‑Forward and received the full $20 million in 2027, plus $5 million from Forward 4.0, FIFA funding would account for 98% of its total income.
However, the FAQ also revealed a potential shortfall for confederations and regional bodies. The $10 billion development pot is broken down as $4.22 billion for the 211 members via Forward 4.0, another $4.22 billion via Fast‑Forward, and $1.56 billion from existing development programmes. The original 2027‑30 budget allocated $1.287 billion to those existing programmes; if unchanged, only $273 million would remain for confederations and other recipients.
In the current 2023‑26 cycle, confederations were slated to receive $360 million and other associations $76 million—a combined $163 million more than the remaining $273 million, suggesting a funding gap. FIFA defends the plan by pointing to similar transactions in other sports. In 2021, La Liga sold future broadcasting rights to private‑equity firm CVC for over €2 billion (about $2.4 billion). UEFA runs UC3, a joint commercial venture for its European competitions, although UC3 has not been sold to outside investors.
Critics note that Formula 1 operates as a purely commercial, profit‑driven enterprise, whereas FIFA is a not‑for‑profit organisation whose statutes mandate the promotion of football’s educational, cultural and humanitarian values. As a not‑for‑profit, FIFA enjoys a low effective tax rate—about five percent on a pre‑tax surplus of $1.241 billion over the past decade, resulting in a $66 million tax charge.
The question arises: how will a commercial subsidiary like FFE fit within this framework? FIFA pays no dividends, so what will investors receive for their $4.2 billion?
The FAQ claims investors will own a non‑controlling stake in FFE that they can sell in future tender processes overseen by FIFA, but offers no clear dividend or profit‑sharing mechanism. Critics argue that paying $4.2 billion for a stake that provides no governance influence, no dividend rights, and only a vague promise of future value is unreasonable. Beyond the financial mechanics, many members object to the unilateral nature of the proposal. The plan was rolled out without substantive consultation, leading to accusations of a lack of due process.
An anonymous source close to FIFA suggested the organisation faced a dilemma: provide too little detail and appear unserious, or present a near‑finalised plan that seems imposed. The identification of a lead investor before any member vote has only heightened suspicions. The rumored lead investor is Joshua Kushner, head of Thrive Eternal, a vehicle expected to spearhead the investor group for FFE. Kushner is the brother of Jared Kushner, former senior adviser to former President Donald Trump, linking the deal to the Trump orbit—a connection that has fueled further criticism of Infantino’s political affiliations.
While Thrive Capital has donated to Democratic causes, the perception of a Trump‑linked investor has amplified concerns about the sale’s motives. The core controversy, however, remains the potential commodification of the World Cup. The tournament, despite its flaws, is a global event traditionally overseen by a body not formally accountable to private shareholders. Selling a slice of its commercial rights could fundamentally alter that relationship.
Transparency is another issue. While FIFA promises larger payouts to members, the organisation has historically struggled with clear reporting on how World Cup revenues are allocated. The rapid emphasis on increased funding does little to reassure critics that financial governance will improve.
FIFA argues that FFE will boost broadcast‑rights income and other commercial streams, but private investors will naturally seek returns, potentially conflicting with FIFA’s development objectives. The question persists: why does FIFA need an external $4.2 billion injection when it could retain 100% ownership of FFE and still reap long‑term commercial benefits? An anonymous source told The Athletic that the primary purpose of the equity sale is to fund a one‑off $20 million “Fast‑Forward” payment to each member, a move that appears unnecessary if the commercial restructuring could be financed internally. In summary, the proposal has ignited a swift and vocal backlash across the football world.
While the promised development funds are substantial, concerns about governance, transparency, the role of private capital, and the marginalisation of confederations suggest that the plan may be more contentious than beneficial. The ultimate decision rests with the member associations, and their vote will determine whether FIFA proceeds with the stake sale or seeks an alternative path.