The Financial Times broke the story on Tuesday that FIFA is preparing to divest a portion of its commercial arm, sparking a wave of shock and anger throughout the football community. The governing body intends to sell a 21% interest in a newly created subsidiary, FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE), which will house all of its commercial and event‑related activities, including the World Cup – the competition that The Athletic has recently highlighted as the primary source of FIFA's revenue. The plan aims to raise $4.2 billion (£3.2 bn) from outside investors, prompting an immediate narrative that FIFA is effectively putting the World Cup up for sale.
By Wednesday evening, three of FIFA's six continental confederations had publicly condemned the move, and numerous national associations – none of which appear to have been consulted before the leak – joined the criticism. Support for the proposal has been marginal at best. Money, as always, sits at the heart of the controversy. What exactly does FIFA propose, how does it stack up against other sports organisations, and why has the reaction been so hostile?
FFE is pitched as a purpose‑built vehicle designed to maximise FIFA's earnings from commercial deals and event hosting. Using valuation estimates from JP Morgan Chase, FIFA believes FFE could be worth $20 billion, and it plans to sell a 21% slice for $4.2 billion. The equity sale would therefore represent the portion on offer to external investors. Approval for the plan requires the backing of a majority of FIFA's 211 member associations as well as the 37‑member FIFA Council, chaired by President Gianni Infantino.
However, the incentive offered to members goes far beyond the $4.2 billion that would be raised. FIFA promises a $10 billion development fund for the 2027‑2030 cycle – a dramatic increase from the $3.86 billion allocated for development in the current 2023‑2026 period, which itself was only a modest $127 million rise over the original 2027‑2030 budget.
That $10 billion figure covers all development spending, not just the Forward programme, but FIFA has framed the proposal as a way to "immediately boost funding for football development in every corner of the globe" for all 211 members. Notably absent from the announcement and the subsequent FAQ released on Wednesday were any details for the six continental confederations. Each confederation currently receives $15 million per year ($60 million over a four‑year cycle), yet the new financial model only mentions payments to the 211 national associations, leaving the fate of the confederations unclear.
When Infantino took office in 2016, one of his key pledges was to increase financial support to every FIFA member. At that time, each association received roughly $3 million per four‑year cycle.
Forward 1.0 (2016‑18) lifted that to $3.75 million; Forward 2.0 (2019‑22) nearly doubled it to $6 million; Forward 3.0 (through 2026) guarantees at least $8 million; and Forward 4.0, slated for 2027‑2030, is set to deliver just under $10 million per association. The new proposal dwarfs those amounts: FIFA is offering $40 million to each member over the next four years – $20 million via Forward 4.0 and an additional $20 million through a brand‑new optional scheme called FIFA Fast‑Forward. Multiplying the second $20 million by 211 members yields the $4.2 billion that FIFA hopes to raise from the equity sale. Fast‑Forward has ignited further controversy because it is only available to members who opt‑in by September 19.
Participation in Fast‑Forward is effectively contingent on agreeing to the equity sale; those who miss the deadline will not receive the extra funds. UEFA summed up the situation succinctly, stating that the FAQ document "says everything you need to know about this plan." The premature leak of the proposal left many questions unanswered, prompting FIFA to publish a FAQ to clarify matters.
One of the most pressing queries was how a $4.2 billion equity sale could translate into a $10 billion development pot. FIFA's answer is that the sale would fund $4.2 billion of the development pool, while the remaining $5.8 billion would come from a combination of existing resources and projected revenue growth generated by FFE. The governing body argues that separating commercial activities into a professional, profit‑driven entity will boost earnings beyond the $15 billion currently forecast for the 2023‑2026 cycle. Under the new plan, the Forward budget for 2027‑2030 would rise from $2.7 billion to at least $4.2 billion, reflecting the $20 million per member allocation.
In subsequent cycles, member payments would continue to climb – $22 million for 2031‑2034 and $24 million for 2035‑2038 – meaning that over three cycles each association could receive roughly $86 million, nearly five times the average payout in Forward's first decade. Even without the equity sale, FIFA believes that the creation of FFE alone will generate sufficient cash flow to fund $4.2 billion in Forward payments for 2027‑2030, $4.6 billion for 2031‑2034 and $5.1 billion for 2035‑2038. For many smaller associations, these sums would represent a massive proportion of their total revenue.
Take the Mauritius Football Association, for example: its non‑FIFA turnover in 2025 was only $0.4 million. If the association participates in Fast‑Forward and receives the full $20 million plus the $5 million from Forward 4.0, FIFA funding would account for 98% of its income.
The FAQ also revealed that the $10 billion development pot is split as follows: $4.22 billion for the 211 members via Forward 4.0, another $4.22 billion for the same members through Fast‑Forward, and the remaining $1.56 billion from FIFA's existing development programmes. However, this allocation appears to leave a shortfall for the confederations. In the current cycle, the six confederations are entitled to $360 million, while other regional bodies receive $76 million – a total $163 million higher than the $273 million that would be left after the $4.22 billion member allocations. Critics argue that the plan neglects these crucial stakeholders.
FIFA defends the proposal by pointing to similar transactions in other sports. In 2021, La Liga sold future broadcast rights to private‑equity firm CVC for over €2 billion, and UEFA runs a joint commercial venture, UC3, to manage its European competition rights. While these examples involve commercial entities, they differ in that UEFA has not relinquished ownership to external investors, and Formula 1 operates as a fully commercial, profit‑driven enterprise. FIFA, by contrast, is a not‑for‑profit organisation whose statutes mandate the promotion of football worldwide for its educational, cultural and humanitarian values.
This status grants FIFA tax advantages; over the past decade its pre‑tax surplus of $1.241 billion generated only $66 million in tax, an effective rate of about five percent. The question then arises: how would a for‑profit subsidiary like FFE fit within FIFA's nonprofit framework? FIFA insists that investors would receive a non‑controlling stake in FFE, with the ability to sell their shares in future FIFA‑overseen tender processes, but they would not obtain voting rights, a seat on the Council, or influence over the World Cup's format or other regulatory matters. Critics see this as a poor bargain – a $4.2 billion price tag for a stake that offers no control, no dividend, and only an uncertain future resale value.
Another point of contention is the speed and secrecy of the process. The plan was rolled out without meaningful consultation of the 211 member associations, many of which have expressed dismay at the lack of due process. Sources close to FIFA say the leadership faced a dilemma: provide too little detail and risk being dismissed as unserious, or present a fairly advanced proposal that could be perceived as a fait accompli. The identification of a potential lead investor before any member vote – reportedly Joshua Kushner of Thrive Eternal – has further fueled suspicions of a rushed, top‑down deal.
Kushner, brother‑in‑law to former President Donald Trump, is linked to a group expected to lead the investor consortium for FFE. While Kushner’s own political donations lean Democratic, his familial connection to Trump has been highlighted by critics as evidence of Infantino’s willingness to align with powerful external interests. Beyond the financial mechanics, the core controversy revolves around the World Cup itself.
The tournament remains the flagship event of a global, not‑for‑profit body. Selling a slice of its commercial rights to private equity could fundamentally alter the sport’s governance and its commitment to equitable development. Moreover, concerns persist about the transparency of how World Cup revenues are currently distributed. While FIFA publishes high‑level Forward allocations, many national associations provide limited public disclosure of how they spend those funds.
In summary, FIFA argues that establishing FFE will unlock greater commercial revenue, allowing it to fund an unprecedented $10 billion development programme and dramatically increase payouts to member associations. Critics counter that the plan sidesteps confederations, offers investors a non‑controlling stake with little clear return, and threatens the nonprofit ethos of world football. The ultimate decision rests with the member associations, and the upcoming vote will determine whether FIFA proceeds with the equity sale or seeks an alternative path to sustain its ambitious development goals.